A glimmer of hope : Mr Christofias, Mr Talat and their leftist views

The sentence now figures on a webpage amongst the most meaningful quotes regarding the row, flanked with politicians’ speeches and Un-envoys’ press conferences. However, it tops all those latter ones for its realism, crudely signalling how unfeasible the divided communities of the island consider a settlement. Indeed, for all the failed negotiations devoted to reuniting the rich Greek part and the unrecognized Turkish-occupied and much poorer north, a partition which dates back to 1974, so far a solution might well look unachievable. Yet some very recent circumstances are shedding new light on such efforts as a compromise between the two entities is appearing to be more realistic than ever.

The momentum began when a significant replacement at the helm of the Greek territory, the Republic of Cyprus, took place : February’s elections dethroned Tassos Papadopoulos, a nationalist who as president fiercely opposed the last UN-drafted plan for peace in 2004. The office was won by the communist Dimitris Christofias from AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People), featuring a more moderate and pragmatic stance. Most crucially, Mr Cristofias happens to have some sort of ties with his Turkish counterpart Mehemed Ali Talat, both being old-age comrades from the Pan-Cypriot union and thus sharing the same political ideals. At the time when European Left undergoes a severe crisis of identity, resulting in a huge loss of consensus, its ideology may win a flash of glory providing the common soil for a rapprochement between the two communities.

Mr Cristofias and Mr Talat

Source : www.welt.de

That is truly happening. On 21st April, no later than a month after Mr Christofias swore in, he met Mr Talat in the UN buffer zone in Nicosia, the divided capital of the island. Reportedly blessed by an optimistic climate, the summit not only decreed for an immediate resumption of peace negotiations (ditched since 2004 due to a failed referendum). To further prove their goodwill the two parts also agreed to open a crossing point at Ledra street, a pedestrian thoroughfare in Nicosia which has long symbolized the partition. Technical committees charged with outlining the basis for negotiations started meeting soon afterwards whilst the two presidents continued convening on a nearly two-weekly basis to supervise and review the preparatory work. Eventually, « substantive » talks were initiated on the 11th of September under the auspices of the UN whose presence and intermediation is represented by a new special envoy, the former Australian Foreign Minister Akexander Downer. Will they deliver ? In a recent statement Mr Talat publicly called for the deal to be brokered as soon as possible, namely by end 2008, fearing that such positive trend might soon die out. The Greek Cypriot president has not disavowed the claim. He rather made it clear that his side will show flexibility and understanding. Nonetheless, out of this inedited convergence of wills looms an intricate plot of ethnic resentments, territorial pretensions and delicate international balances. They are all deeply rooted in the biography of the island and have grown and cemented as time passed by. Pundits often recall that over the course of four decades the Cyprus Problem has become legendary in diplomatic and political circles for its intractability. To deploy another salient quote, in truth the title of an essay dedicated to the issue, Mr Talat and Mr Christofias are committing themselves to “the most impossible job in the world”.

Powers, lands and troops : a short history of the dispute

The Greek presence on Cyprus dates back to the origins of western civilization with the arrival of Mycenaeans around 1600 BC. Ever since, it suffered a long string of dominations, from Alexander the Great, to the Romans, to the Venice Republic. Not surprisingly therefore, the most of troubles originated just from the foreign occupations, notably the last two. First, under the Ottoman Empire’s grip, which lasted for 250 years, Turks settled in the island in return for lands. But were eventually the Britons that, taking over in place of the collapsed Turkish Empire, brought about a separation between the two communities by pitting them one against each other in order to maintain power. Once the Britons declared Cyprus to be a Crown Colony, in 1925, they systematically exploited and fomented Turkish Cypriots fears to fall under a Greek-hegemonic state. On the other hand, they frustrated Greek Cypriots claims to reunite the island with Greece (a struggle named enosis which has often resulted in violent uproars), thus reinforcing their community sense. In light of this, it was not unpredictable that the liable compromise on which the state was shored up when it finally attained independence in 1960 would soon fall apart. Add that the two communities’ motherlands, Greece and Turkey, were to enhance their reciprocal roles in the dispute, and the current shape of the conflict is nearly clear. On 21 December 1963, intercommunal fighting finally erupted in Nicosia and quickly spread throughout the country. The convoluted institutional mechanisms provided for by the new constitution had turned out to be ineffective and very soon had triggered many disputes, particularly on the autonomy of Turkish municipalities. Hence only when a UN peacekeeping force was dispatched the turmoil ceased.

Such events highlight a first capital element of the dispute : the sharing of power. Devising a state frame which may content the centralist instinct of Greek Cypriots, welcoming at the same time the Turkish Cypriots queries for more local powers, has been so far impracticable. In 1963, as Turks withdrew from the government inaugurating a separated life in de facto enclaves, the responsibility of the smooth and peaceful working of Cypriot institutions laid with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, co-signatories to the treaties which had established the independence from the UK itself. However, during the following ten years the two Mediterranean countries strived to convert the local conflict into an international showdown, driving the island to a deadlock.

The second peculiarity of the conflict rests thereby on the strained relationships between Greece and Turkey. Troubles began with a military junta seizing power in Greece. When it attempted a coup d’état against President Makarios on 15 July 1974 aimed at uniting Cyprus with Greece, Turkey react angrily by invading and occupying with its troops the northern part of the island (37 per cent) where Turkish Cypriots were living. The effect of the division was catastrophic. Thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriots were killed or wounded. Most significantly, two hundred thousands people had been displaced. In particular Greek Cypriots in the north (roughly 145 thousand people, i.e. nearly half the Greek Cypriot population of the island) were forced by the advancing Turkish Army to flee south, leaving behind all their properties.

Turkish troops presiding over the north

Source : http://cache.daylife.com

That deprivation constitutes the third and biggest issue : Greek Cypriots would never consent to a deal unless they are returned the lands forcedly relinquished during the escape or awarded with an appropriate compensation. Up to now all plans to meet such expectation have been rejected as unfair.

In 1975 Turkish Cypriot authorities unilaterally declared the so-called ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’. This was renamed in November 1983 the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)’, the sole Turkey recognising it against unanimous condemnation expressed by the UN General Assembly. The odd separation, guarded by an Un-controlled buffer zone, has endured ever since. Innumerable endeavours to reunite the two parts have badly imploded.

The last unfortunate chapter of the saga bears the name of Kofi Annan : he sponsored a plan that after interminable negotiations and revisions was put to referendum on April 2004. While 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the proposals, an overwhelming 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots opposed the agreement. One week later Cyprus embarked on the European Union, a watershed in terms of economical benefits which has not altered the political status quo, though.

Legal paradoxes : where EU law doesn’t apply

Legally speaking, the membership of the EU has made things even more complicated. If Cyprus represents an anomaly in International Law, now it has also earned the status of an exception to the European legislation. In principle, the whole island should lie under the EU umbrella since the Republic of Cyprus is the only entity legitimized to wield its sovereignty on it. However, with over 35 thousand Turkish soldiers stationed in the north, one may easily conclude that a little fragment of the EU soil undergoes a military occupation or, to put it more mildly, that European law doesn’t apply there. Most oddly Turkey is also an official candidate to join the European club since 1999.

Map of the divided island

Source : http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk

Many in Brussels say Cyprus should never have been admitted as a divided island. In truth, the EU had no choice. Greece made it clear that it would not approve any new expansion of the EU unless it included Cyprus. In the aftermath the Union has generously attempted to foster reconciliation through its familiar soft power instruments. An aid package of 269 million euros meant for infrastructures and a regulation to facilitate direct trade between the north and the EU had been put forward. As for the first measure, it has been tiredly enacted in 2006 for only half the abovementioned amount. The deadline for deploying the cash is nearing, yet by March 2008 only a bare 5% of it had been spent. Greek Cypriots have indeed tried hard to block or delay any project that implied recognition of the Turkish authorities. The direct trade regulation languishes at the Council of Ministries, its approval currently frozen due to Cypriots fierce objections. The result is a miserable percentage of two-way trade across the Green Line with the black-market trade flourishing. As « The Economist » recently pointed out, such impediments to the economic integration may affect negatively the peace process. Meanwhile, the EU has to bear a difficult responsibility : honouring the will of a member State (Cyprus) without straining relationships with a strategic partner (Turkey).

No trust, no unity

After all, in spite of global optimism, it is not taken for granted that the two parts would ultimately strike a deal. The first big issue on the table, regarding the constitution, is already revealing rather tough. In principle the communities concur on the conferral on a future state of the framework of « a bizonal and bicommunal federation », an option fully advocated by the UE as well as the UN. Yet divergences multiply as soon as the concept of federation is put to discussion : interpretations collide on the institutional guidelines, not to mention technical details. Kibris, a Turkish Cypriot daily, some weeks ago circulated some discomforting news about the talks.

Citing a diplomatic source the newspaper maintained that from the 20 chapters discussed in what concerned Governance and power sharing by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat and President Dimitris Christofias, only in seven chapters it was possible for an understanding to be reached. Few days later, the UN envoy has expressed concern over the slow progression of talks. Assuming that the constitutional issue would be settled, still the parts must address two bigger matters : the presence of Turkish troops and the restitution of lands expropriated in 1974.

The first issue rests with the struggle for power underway in Turkey between the governing AKP, a mildly Islamic party with business-oriented views, and the secularist and more nationalist army, to which the constitution warrants a last say on many crucial affairs. The AKP officials favour the reunification of the island and the consequent withdrawal of the troops. On the contrary, the Army views its military presence on north Cyprus as a pride, not least as a solid proof of its lasting power. It is unlikely that it would give up on it with an internal war to control the reins of Turkey underway. It would amount to a sign of weakness at a time when it must show off its strength to retain its outdated political pre-eminence. And as any Cypriot knows for certain the North Cyprus institutions are under the firm grip of the Turkish generals.

As for the expropriated terrains, the circumstances look equally discomforting. Most Turkish Cypriots proved ready to address the issue voting in favour of the Annan plan which foresaw a partial, but conspicuous, restitution of lands along with compensations. But in the aftermath of the referendum they started ceding lots to foreign investors that in turn have already sold thousands Villas to would-be tourists. How to deal with it ? Of course the election of Mr Christofias proves the Greek Cypriots’ desire to put an end to a tiresome dispute. On the other side of the wall, Turkish Cypriots are desperate for joining the benefits of the UE membership.

Undoubtedly there may be room for an agreement. Even so a further factor must be tackled before celebrating the end of a diplomatic nightmare : the lack of trust. As a pundit puts it : that is the most difficult barrier for Cypriots seeking reunification. Even if diplomats reach an agreement to solve technical issues, the bitter history and mistrust between the ethnic groups lowers the chances of a peaceful symbiosis.